Grand Logistics

Stand Alone Defensive System

2011-10-18T17:53:00.000-07:00

In previous posts we have used the phrase "Stand Alone Defensive System" (S.A.D.S.),here we will explain what such a thing is.

A Stand Alone Defensive System in not an existing weapon system,it is a concept for a future system.

It may be a missile system

It may be a gun system.

It may be a combination missile and gun system.

It may even be a directed energy weapon system.

Most elements of the system would be lower cost non-developmental items as there is a wide range of radars,guns,ammunition,Auxiliary Power Units (A.P.U.s) and other components available either "off the shelf" or made to order.

A Stand Alone Defensive System is a replacement for the many types of light cannon and Close In Weapons Systems in use today.

Many modern warships carry 4 short range guns,these may be replaced by just 2 well placed Stand Alone Defensive Systems reducing weight and manpower requirements.

A Stand Alone Defensive System serves the following primary purposes:

Short range defensive armament for warships in the event that their other weapons fail due to human error,technical problems or battle damage;

Short range defensive armament for civilian vessels,auxiliary naval vessels and other craft which would not otherwise be armed.

It may also perform the following secondary roles:

Engaging low value targets where more expensive weapons are not neccessary;

Firing warning shots.

There are three fundamental qualities which a Stand Alone Defensive System must posess:

It Stands Alone.

The system must be be a fully self contained unit,capable of fully independent operation,though it may also be able to operate with external control and power;

It is defensive.

It must be able to engage short range targets on land,on sea or in the air,even if the ship it is on has been hit and it's crew killed or wounded;

It is a system.

It must be a fully self contained unit including the weapon,ammunition,sensors,fire control system and power supply required for extended operation without external input.

These qualities require the following features:

It must not penetrate the deck on which it is mounted.

This allows it to be mounted above the bridge and helicopter hanger on warships.

This also allows it to be mounted on civilian or other vessels with only minor strengthening to the deck of the ship.

It must have it's own on board power supply.

This allows it to operate when external power is not available due to technical failure,human error or battle damage,though it may also be connected to an external power source when one is available.

It must have all of it's ammunition supply on the mount and ready to use.

This allows it to operate without the need for reloading by crew members who may have become casualties or be occupied with damage control duties.

This also allows it to be carried by a civilian or other vessel with no magazine space to store ammunition and no trained crew members to do the reloading.

It must be capable of operating for long periods with little or no maintenance.

This allows it to continue operating without needing maintenance to be done by crew members who may have become casualties or be occupied with damage control duties.

This also allows it to be carried by a civilian or other vessel with little or no support crew.

It must be protected against shock.

This allows it to continue operating after the ship which is carrying it has been hit by a missile or torpedo.

It must be protected against fragmentation.

This allows it to continue operating after the ship which is carrying it has been hit by a missile or torpedo.

It must be light enough to be mounted above the ship's superstructure.

This allows it to have wide firing arcs unobstructed by the ship's superstructure.

It must be able to engage targets on land,on sea or in the air.

This allows it to defend against the full range of above water threats.

It must have it's own on board sensors.

This allows it to detect,track and engage targets without the help of external sensors which may not be available due to technical failure,human error or battle damage.

This also allows it to detect,track and engage targets without the help of external sensors which may not be available if it is mounted on a civilian vessel which does not have such systems.

We are not aware of any current system which meets all of these requirements.

However,there are many existing systems which meet some but not all of these requirements.

The BAE Mark 38 Mod 2 25mm chain gun does not require any deck penetration.

Auxiliary Power Units are commonly found on military land systems such as the Gepard anti-aircraft vehicle.

Many systems carry large amounts of ammunition on the mount.

This Rolling Airframe Missile launcher appears to be mounted on shock absorbing wire rope mounts.

Protection against fragmentation was standard equipment on most anti-aircraft guns during the Second World War.

This Bofors 40mm Mark 4 is light enough to be mounted above the bridge or hangar on many large warships.

This Bofors 57mm Mark110 is capable of engaging the full range of air and surface targets.

This SeaRAM launcher has the full range of sensors required for autonomous detection and tracking of air and surface targets.

A Stand Alone Defensive System must combine all of these features.

The above illustration shows the firing arcs for 2 Stand Alone Defensive Systems (and a larger gun in "A position") mounted above the hangar and bridge on our Falklands class frigate template.

These 2 Stand Alone Defensive Systems provide better all round coverage and redundancy than the 4 side mounted light cannon carried by a Daring class destroyer,only 2 of which are capable of engaging missiles.

If a Phalanx anti-missile system fails on a Daring class destroyer it leaves a blind arc of about 180 degrees,requiring a turn of up to 90 degrees for the ship to bring the weapon on it's other beam to bear.

If a Stand Alone Defensive System fails on a Falklands class frigate it leaves a blind arc of only about 20 degrees,requiring a turn of around 10 degrees for the ship to bring it's remaining system to bear.

In total,the Stand Alone Defensive Systems on the Falklands class frigate provide about 680 degrees of coverage compared to about 360 degrees for the Phalanx systems on the Daring class destroyers.

The tumble home of the superstructure of the Falklands class,combined with the narrowness of the bridge and the pedestal atop the hangar,also allows excellent depression to engage targets very close to the ship.

The loss and damage of Her Majesty's Ships Sheffield, Coventry and Glasgow during the Falklands War of 1982,demonstrated the importance of a Stand Alone Defensive System on a modern warship.

In each of these cases the ships' main weapon systems failed to engage for various reasons but none of these vessels was equipped with an adequate back up short range air defence system.

The loss of the unarmed Atlantic Conveyor to an attack by an Exocet anti-shipping missile demonstrated the need for sea lift ships to carry an air defence system.

The bombing of M.V. British Wye by an Argentinian Hercules demonstrated the need for fleet replenishment vessels to carry an air defence system.

The loss and damage of the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram demonstrated the need for amphibious landing ships to carry an adequate air defence system.

During the same conflict the Argentinian corvette Guerrico demonstrated the importance of having a back up system which can engage land targets at short ranges when she suffered failures of her 20mm cannon,40mm cannon and 100mm gun while being fired upon by Royal Marines on South Georgia.

The attack on the United States Ship (U.S.S.) Cole in port in Yemen highlighted the need for a close range defensive system to engage small boats at close range.

On a Falklands class frigate there are 2 independent Stand Alone Defensive Systems covering most bearings,providing a high degree of redundancy in the event of a failure at a critical moment.

An aircraft carrier will require 4 Stand Alone Defensive Systems.

A surface combatant will require 2 Stand Alone Defensive Systems.

An amphibious dock ship will require 2 Stand Alone Defensive Systems.

A replenishment ship will require 2 Stand Alone Defensive Systems.

A sealift ship will require 2 Stand Alone Defensive Systems.

A minor warship intended for lower threat environments may need only 1 Stand Alone Defensive System.

A fleet such as the Royal Navy's may require a total of over 100 Stand Alone Defensive Systems.

New Chinese Aircraft Carrier Puts To Sea For The First Time

2011-08-10T04:29:00.000-07:00

Today China joined the elite group of first tier navies.

Just months after David Cameron signalled Britain's withdrawal from the World stage by scrapping the Royal Navy's aircraft carrier capability,China's first aircraft carrier has put to sea on trials.

China will soon be one of only a handful of countries capable of delivering air power anywhere in the World without asking any country for permission.

Ministry Of Defence Police Acting Illegally?

2011-08-06T17:10:00.000-07:00

There is an interesting post on the EUReferendum blog.

The author was stopped and questioned by members of the Ministry Of Defence Police force*.

This stop and search was presumably under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000,if it was not on Ministry Of Defence property.

The provisions of which were ruled illegal by the European Court of Human Rights on the 12th of January 2010.

In fact the British government had agreed to suspend section 44:

"3. Following the courts judgment in Gillan and Quinton the UK

government announced that it would suspend the use of S 44 stop and

search without reasonable suspicion.

Guidance was accordingly disseminated to chief constables to suspend use of this power."

Doctor North might like to seek legal clarification over this incident.

The noted Eurosceptic failed to notice the number plate of the police vehicle which stopped him.

He may notice the irony if this stop was indeed in violation of European law.

*Not neccessarily those shown in the above picture which is taken from the Ministry Of Defence website and used here only for illustrative purposes.

Italian Frigate Fired On By Missile Off Libya

2011-08-03T17:13:00.000-07:00

There are reports that there has been a possible attack on an Italian Frigate off the Libyan coast.

The Italian warship Bersagliere was operating just 12 miles (some sources say 15 miles) from the Libyan coast at the time of the incident.

This is close enough for her 127mm gun to bombard targets ashore.

The missile is reported to have missed the Soldati class frigate Bersagliere by 2,000 metres.

The origins of the missile have been described as unknown which leaves open the possibility that this may have been a "friendly fire" incident (Edit : it has since been confirmed that the missile was fired by Libyan forces).

The Soldati class are small frigates related to the Lupo class.

These ships had an interesting history,having been originally ordered by Iraq they were never delivered due to an arms embargo,an incident demonstrating the importance of security of supply.

A New American Frigate

2011-08-01T14:59:00.000-07:00

In an earlier post we gave an illustration of what we wished to see in a future frigate for the Royal Navy.

Today we will look at what might be a suitable replacement for the American Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates.

The above illustration applies existing American weapon and sensor systems to our "Falkland class frigate" template.

Such as the 5 inch (127mm) Mark 45 Mod 4 gun.

The Mark 41 Vertical Launch System.

The Phalanx 1B.

Or,alternatively,SeaRAM.

AN/SPY 1F.

The MH 60R Seahawk.

Multi Function Towed Array AN/SQR 20.

All guns and missiles cover most bearings abeam of the ship,a narrow arc on the bow is covered by missiles,5" gun and a single Phalanx/SeaRam and a narrow arc on the stern is covered only by missiles and a single Phalanx/SeaRam but all weapons can be brought to bear on any bearing with a minimum of manoeuvering.

Other systems might include the Converteam Advanced Induction Motor.

LM2500 G4 Gas Turbine Generator.

All of these systems are "off the shelf" or made to order non developmental items.

The only thing which needs to be designed from scratch is a new hull to put those systems in,as the British can afford to design a new 6,850 tonne frigate,it is difficult to see why the United States' Navy could not do the same.

They could even share the Royal Navy's design (though the current design needs more work,note the poor firing arcs of the Phalanx).

The end result might be a frigate looking a little like this.

The configurable deck mentioned above is a flat load bearing area with access to the sea or pierside.

It may be enclosed or open.

It has connections for communications,power,potable and waste water services.

Items may be secured here by means of tie downs built in to the deck,bolts or welds.

Although it will be most often used as a location for boats and davits,the configurable deck can carry many other items including mines,mine hunting equipment,vehicles,submersibles,accommodation,stores,cruise missiles,sensors or any other mission specific equipment which the frigate may be required to carry either temporarily or permanently.

The unusual location of the Magazine Torpedo Launch System (an alternative to the Mark 32 Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes found on American ships) is based on the principle of,as far as is practical,keeping ordnance towards the extremities of the hull for damage control purposes as well as allowing a simple arrangement of torpedoes stored facing for'ard but launching on each beam.

That location was originally conceived as a suitable place for heavyweight torpedoes,which are not commonly carried by modern surface combatants.

Squad Mission Support System

2011-07-29T08:50:00.000-07:00

Sometimes armed forces have a habit of making the simple and cheap expensive and complicated.

This was brought to our attention by Solomon's S.N.A.F.U. blog.

This is the United States' Army's new Squad Mission Support System,an unmanned vehicle to carry 600lbs (375kg) of kit for foot soldiers which is said to cost U.S. $500,000 (£312,000) each.

This is the British Army's Supacat All Terrain Mobile Platform (A.T.M.P.) which carries a payload of 1.6 tonnes (3,520 lbs) and cost about £46,000 each (U.S. $74,000) including a trailer back in 1997,today they can be purchased used at a very reasonable £9,500 (U.S.$15,200).

Infantrymen have to carry large amounts of equipment when they are operating in areas where vehicles cannot operate such as jungles,forests or mountains like the troops shown above in the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan.

At most other times they will be on bases or operating alongside vehicles which can carry their kit for them.

The Squad Mission Support System cannot follow the infantry in very close terrain,it can only go to places where a manned vehicle could go.

But unlike the driver of a manned vehicle it cannot keep it's eyes and ears open for the enemy,pick up a rifle and shoot,provide medical attention to wounded men or even change it's own tyres when they are punctured.

To an infantry section it is more of a burden and less of a benefit than a manned vehicle.

Is it worth the loss of military capability and huge procurement cost of an unmanned vehicle just to save the wages of an 18 year old driver?

Member Of Parliament Opens His Eyes

2011-07-21T22:19:00.000-07:00

This blog is not about politics.

But as European integration is the driving force behind the British Government's defence policy it is difficult to ignore it.

It is also difficult to ignore the fact that many in the British political and military establishment seem to have little idea that British defence policy is largely driven by the European Union.

Conservative Member of Parliament Douglas Carswell has been mentioned on this blog in an earlier post.

Mr.Carswell appears to be under the misapprehension that the British government follows a "buy British" defence procurement policy.

Even though it has for many years been following an avowedly "buy European" policy in line with European Union policy and at the cost of thousands of British jobs.

He also seems to think that the planned sharing of British and French aircraft carriers is the result of this "buy British" policy rather than a deliberate decision by the British government to participate in the creation of a pan-European naval force.

Military independence and political independence are indivisible.

Which is why independent nations try to buy domestically wherever it is practical.

Having surrendered the largest empire the World had ever seen as a result of inadequate security of supply,the British government should understand this better than most.

Without security of supply Britain does not have military independence.

Without military independence Britain does not have political independence.

Without political independence the British government cannot further the interests of the British people.

Which is why the European Union wants to replace national security of supply with European security of supply.

Even if Douglass Carswell does not understand the political importance of security of supply,the European Union certainly does.

However,if Mr.Carswell is not up to speed on defence procurement he does seem to have finally realised that the British government is following a policy of European integration.

Which he should have been able to work out from the tacit support of the Lisbon Treaty from Britain's Europeanist Prime Minister David Cameron.

The leader of Douglas Carswell's own Conservative party.

What Have Kiowa Warrior And Lynx Wildcat Got In Common?

2011-07-12T21:26:00.000-07:00

The Agusta Westland Lynx Wildcat reconnaissance helicopter is often criticised for having it's sensors mounted on it's nose.

Many believe a reconnaissance helicopter should have these sensors mounted above the rotor head in what is known as a Mast Mounted Sight (M.M.S.).

This is where the OH 58D Kiowa carries it's sensors.

Mounting the sensors up high allows the helicopter to see over cover while hovering behind it protected from enemy fire.

This was very useful during the Cold War when these helicopters were expected to be falling back on to friendly terrain ahead of advancing Soviet tank armies.

However,recent operations have seen American forces moving fast and high over terrain controlled by the enemy.

Seeing what is beneath the helicopter is now regarded as more important than hiding behind hills and you can't do that with an M.M.S..

Which is why the latest "F" model of the Kiowa Warrior will have it's sensors relocated to the aircraft's nose.

Just Like the Wildcat.

But with even better all round coverage thanks to the under nose location.

There have also been suggestions that Mast Mounted Sights suffer from vibration more than nose mounted sights.

The Cost Of A Catapult

2011-07-10T18:02:00.001-07:00

Some time ago in our post titled "Why Catapults Are Cheaper",we said the following:

"The cost of a British electromagnetic catapult system from Converteam is not public knowledge so we can but mention it but prices for the American system are known."

We may now know how much Converteam's catapult costs.

According to this week's Sunday Times newspaper,Converteam have offered to build a land based full scale prototype electro magnetic catapult and a ship set (2 catapults) for a Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier at a cost of £140 Million.

This compares very well with the published cost of the American electro magnetic catapult system which we also covered in our earlier post:

"The cost of the Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (E.M.A.L.S.) ship set for the same vessel is up to $573 Million (£370 Million*).

That is for a set of four catapults,enough for both new British aircraft carriers."

The American system comes in at an average of £92 Million per catapult (a more recent document suggests £105 Million per catapult) versus an average of £47 Million per catapult for the British system if the Sunday Times report is correct.

It would be interesting to know how the price of British arresting gear (made by MacTaggart Scott,inventors of the steam catapult) compares to that of the American Advanced Arresting Gear which costs £66 Million per set.

*Based on exchange rates on the 17th of September 2010 when the earlier post was written.

Extreme Fishing In The Gulf With The Royal Navy

2011-07-05T16:15:00.000-07:00

The one that got away.

This video was published by Newsweek,and was brought to our attention by the CGBlog.

The article is unclear as to whether these are hostile Iranians or just innocent fisherman.

The video does not show what led up to this moment.

It is not clear if the boat was approaching the warship despite the visual and audible warnings or because of them.

Well placed warning shots clarified the situation for the crew of the small boat.

Post metrification,do youngsters get taught how big 100 yards is these days?

Note references in the video to "Port Battery P1",which we explained in an earlier post.

Some Statistics On Royal Canadian Air Force Operations In Libya

2011-06-24T21:27:00.000-07:00

On the 18th of March 2011,Peter MacKay the Canadian Minister of National Defence announced the deployment of CF188 Hornets as part of Operation Mobile to support United nations resolution 1973.

Canadian CF188 Hornets and other aircraft passed through Prestwick in Scotland the following day,the 19th of March 2011,on their way to Trapani air base in Sicily.

Canadian Hornets flew their first combat sortie on the 21st of March 2011.

Up to the 15th of June 2011,a period which covers a total of 86 days,6 Canadian CF188 Hornets had flown 418 combat sorties.

Which means that the Canadian CF188s have flown an average of about 4.9 sorties per day.

That is an average of 0.8 sorties per aircraft per day.

This compares very well to the 12 Royal Air Force Tornados based at Goia Del Colle.

The 12 Tornados averaged 6 sorties per day over the first 50 days of Operation Ellamy.

An average of 0.5 sorties per aircraft per day for the British bombers.

Thus the Canadian CF188s are generating about 60% more sorties per aircraft per day than the Royal Air Force Tornados.

The average length of a Canadian CF188 Hornet sortie over Libya is just under 5 hours.

The average length for a Royal Air Force Tornado sortie over Libya is 5.5 hours.

The Canadian base at Trapani in Sicily is about 350* Miles from Tripoli.

The British base at Gioia Del Colle in Italy is about 580* Miles from Tripoli.

So the Royal Air Force Tornados must fly about 1,160 Miles just to transit to and from Tripoli.

The Canadian CF188 Hornets must fly about 700 Miles to transit to and from Tripoli.

Assuming an average transit speed of 500 miles per hour,the extra 460 Miles which the Tornados must fly on each sortie is likely to absorb about an extra 55 minutes of their flying time on each sortie.

Which suggests that the average Canadian Hornet sortie generates about 25 minutes more time on station over Libya than the average Royal Air Force Tornado sortie.

Time on station per sortie over Libya averages about 3 hours 36 minutes for the Canadian Hornets and about 3 hours and 11 minutes for the Royal Air Force Tornados.

The Canadian Hornets appear to be generating both more sorties per aircraft per day than the British Tornados and more time on station per sortie.

Between them,the 6 Canadian Hornets are generating about 18 hours on station over Libya each day,an average of 3 hours on station per Hornet per day.

The 12 British Tornados are generating 19 hours on station over Libya each day,an average of 1 hour and 35 minutes on station per Tornado per day.

Each Canadian Hornet is generating 89% more time on station over Libya per day than each British Tornado.

*Distances from google Earth.

Fire Scout Versus Kiowa

2011-06-23T14:13:00.000-07:00

The renaissance of the unmanned aircraft has been perceived as a revolution in military technology which will transform warfare.

Unmanned aircraft are often perceived as new types of weapon systems having little in common with existing military aircraft.

But is that the case?

Fire Scout is a small helicopter which carries an optical sensor turret and lightweight missiles,it has a gross weight of 3,150 pounds,a maximum speed of 115 knots,a ceiling of 20,000 feet,an endurance of over 8 hours and each one costs an average of (U.S.) $17 Million / (U.K.) £10.6 Million (Financial Year 2011 figures).

Kiowa Warrior is a small helicopter which carries an optical sensor turret and lightweight missiles,it has a gross weight of 5,500 pounds,a maximum speed of 125 knots,a ceiling of 19,000 feet,an endurance of 2 hours and each one costs an average of $8.1 Million / £5 Million (Financial year 1999 figures).

Some Statistics On Royal Air Force Operations In Libya

2011-06-22T22:01:00.000-07:00

Statistics on Royal Air Force operations over Libya have been rather scant and incomplete.

This has made it rather difficult to judge the performance of British combat aircraft in Operation Ellamy.

However,there are now some useful pieces of information available.

On the 19th of May 2011,Scottish Member of Parliament (M.P.) Angus Robertson asked the following question in the House Of Commons:

"To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many missions the (a) Nimrod R1, (b) Sentinel R1, (c) VC-10 and (d) C-130 have flown in Operation Ellamy."

He received the following answer from the Secretary of State for Defence Dr.Liam Fox:

"Up to 8 May 2011 the UK has flown the following sorties in support of Operation Ellamy:

Aircraft type	Number of sorties ⁽¹⁾
VC10	110
C130	15
Nimrod	20
Sentinel	50
⁽¹⁾ Numbers are rounded to the nearest five."

Mr.Robertson went on to ask the following:

"To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many sorties the (a) GR4 Tornado and (b) Typhoon has flown in Operation Ellamy;what type of mission was flown in each case;and how many weapons of each type were released;

(2) how many dual mode Brimstone missiles have been used by UK forces in Operation Ellamy to date."

Dr.Fox replied:

"Up to 8 May 2011 the UK has flown about 300 GR4 Tornado and 140 Typhoon sorties as part of Operation Ellamy.

Both aircraft types have conducted missions to protect civilians in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1973,and the Typhoons have also conducted missions in support of no-fly zone enforcement.

In all,approximately 240 weapons have been fired by these aircraft during these missions.

These were a combination of Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone and Storm Shadow missiles,Enhanced Paveway II and Paveway IV Precision Guided Munitions.

I am unable to provide a breakdown of these figures for reasons of operational security."

Operation Ellamy began on the 19th of March 2011,which means these figures cover the 50 days between then and the 8th of May.

Over that period V.C.10 tanker aircraft have flown 110 sorties or about 2.2 sorties per day.

It is difficult to calculate a sortie generation figure for these aircraft as numbers involved in this operation appear to vary over time,most recently the International Institute for Strategic Studies said that 6 V.C.10s were involved in Operation Ellamy,other sources often put the figure at 3 V.C.10s.

These numbers would give us a best case of 0.73 sorties per aircraft per day and a worst case of 0.37 sorties per aircraft per day.

Both of these figures are well below the 1 sortie per aircraft per day which the Royal Air Force tanker fleet often generates in combat.

The C130 Hercules transports flew 15 sorties or about 0.3 sorties per day ,1 sortie every 3 days on average.

Nimrod R.1 electronic reconnaissance aircraft flew 20 sorties or about 0.4 sorties per day,2 sorties every 5 days on average.

As there is only 1 Nimrod based at Akrotiri,this gives 0.4 sorties per aircraft per day.

The Sentinel R.1 radar reconnaissance aircraft flew 50 sorties or about 1 sortie per day.

With 2 Sentinels based at Akrotiri,this equates to 0.5 sorties per aircraft per day.

It is likely to take about 4 hours for the Sentinel to transit to and from Cyrus to Tripoli on each sortie.

Tornado bombers flew 300 sorties or about 6 sorties per day.

As there have been 12 Tornados involved for most of Operation Ellamy,this equates to just over 0.5 sorties per aircraft per day,well below the 0.8 sorties per aircraft per day which Canadian Hornets are generating.

Flying sorties of 5.5 hours duration on average,the 12 British Tornados are generating 19 hours on station over Libya each day,an average of 1 hour and 35 minutes on station per Tornado per day (assuming an average transit speed of 500 miles per hour over the 580 miles between Gioia Del Colle and Tripoli).

This compares poorly with the 3 hours on station which each Canadian Hornet generates per day.

Each Canadian Hornet is generating 89% more time on station over Libya per day than each British Tornado.

Typhoon fighters flew 140 sorties or about 2.8 sorties per day.

A total of 240 weapons were released,an average of 4.8 weapons per day or 0.55 weapons per fast jet sortie.

It is interesting to note that,other than a handful of Storm Shadow missiles,these weapons range from the 1,000 pound (450kg) bomb based Enhanced Paveway II down to the 110 pound (50kg) Brimstone.

Thus weapon expenditure in 50 days of combat over Libya probably totals less than about 120 tonnes of ordnance and could be as little as 12 tonnes.

By way of comparison,a large aircraft carrier like the Nimitz class carries about 3,200 tonnes of ordnance,with the replenishment vessel which accompanies it carrying a similar amount.

The French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle carries 600 tonnes of ordnance (other sources say 2,100 tons) and 3,200 tonnes of aviation fuel.

It would be interesting to know how much ordnance is carried by the Royal Navy's Invincible class ships and also by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's replenishment vessels,unfortunately we do not know the answer to that but it is likely to be far higher than 120 tonnes.

The only figures we have for the ordnance capacity of the forthcoming Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers are unfortunately expressed in cubic metres rather than tonnes which is less than helpful.

MQ8B Fire Scout Unmanned Helicopter Shot Down Over Libya

2011-06-21T07:54:00.000-07:00

A North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) unmanned helicopter appears to have been shot down in Libya*.

Film shown by C.N.N. appears to show the remains of an MQ8B Fire Scout helicopter,a type used by the United States' Navy.

As far as this blog is aware this may be the first unmanned helicopter to be shot down in combat.

If the loss was due to enemy action it is possible that it was the result of the unmanned helicopter having less situational awareness than a manned aircraft and if that is the case there are serious implications for the unmanned helicopter program.

*Thanks to Solomon at SNAFU for highlighting that.

Fast Landing Craft (FLC)

2011-06-21T07:27:00.000-07:00

This is BMT's design for a fast landing craft to meet British Ministry of Defence requirements.

That is Not A Bomb

2011-06-20T11:46:00.000-07:00

This is a bomb!

The United Kingdom,A Sovereign Nation?

2011-06-19T21:04:00.000-07:00

A sovereign nation is one which makes it's own laws.

Most people in the United Kingdom,including most politicians,regard their country as a sovereign nation.

Most believe they are ruled by the laws made by the parliament which they elect.

Unfortunately,that is not the case.

This is made clear in the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Lisbon Treaty:

"Declaration concerning primacy

The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union,the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States,under the conditions laid down by the said case law.

The Conference has also decided to attach as an Annex to this Final Act the Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the primacy of EC law as set out in 11197/07 (JUR 260):

"Opinion of the Council Legal Service of 22 June 2007

It results from the case-law of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a cornerstone principle of Community law.

According to the Court, this principle is inherent to the specific nature of the European Community.

At the time of the first judgment of this established case law (Costa/ENEL,15 July 1964, Case 6/641*) there was no mention of primacy in the treaty.

It is still the case today.

The fact that the principle of primacy will not be included in the future treaty shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and the existing case-law of the Court of Justice."

*“It follows… that the law stemming from the treaty,an independent source of law,could not,because of its special and original nature,be overridden by domestic legal provisions,however framed,without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question.”

What To Buy Dad For Christmas

2011-06-18T19:33:00.000-07:00

If he is a well known fighter pilot:

We can't help but wonder if the great man has one.

Biplanes Of The Second World War

2011-06-17T19:59:00.000-07:00

The Defense And Freedom blog has an interesting article on the Henschel HS123 biplane which served in the Second World War.

There were a number of other biplanes which saw service during that war,including Gloster Gladiator N5579 which is seen here after being captured in Norway some time after she shot down a Heinkel 111 on April the 25th 1940.

The Gloster Gladiators "Faith","Hope" and "Charity" are famous for their defence of Malta but Gladiators saw combat in many different air arms of many different countries,including the Luftwaffe,a carrier capable variant was used by the Royal Air Force's greatest adversary the Fleet Air Arm.

The Fairey Swordfish,known as the Stringbag,served throughout the war,even outliving aircraft which were meant to replace it,again operating on land and sea it was used by The Royal Navy,Royal Air Force as well as Canada,New Zealand,Australia and even Italy and Spain and was still in production in 1944.

The Italian Fiat CR.42 Falco served with Italian,Hungarian,German,Iraqi and Belgian air forces in many theatres.

Thousands of Polikarpov I 153s served with Soviet forces as well as with the Chinese and Finns.

The Japanese Kawasaki Ki 10 also served during the Second World War.

Czech,Slovak and Bulgarian forces used the Avia B534 until 1944.

The Grumman J2F-5 Duck served throughout the war with the United States Army,Navy,Marines and of course the Coast Guard.

Thousands of American and allied pilots learnt to fly on the Boeing-Stearman Model 75.

The Curtis SOC Seagull also served throughout the war even being reintroduced to front line service to replace the aircraft which was meant to replace it.

The Hall PH 3 was used by the United States Coast Guard until 1944.

The Vickers Vildebeest (and the closely related Vincent) saw considerable action including attacking Japanese Warships,they served with both British and New Zealand forces being finally withdrawn in 1944.

The Fairey Albacore was one of the last military biplanes to enter service,serving with the Royal Navy,Royal Air Force and Canadians from 1940 to 1944,it is interesting to note that the Swordfish,which the Albacore was intended to replace,was still in production in the year the Albacore was withdrawn from service.

The Gloster Gauntlet saw service with British,Finnish,Danish and South African forces,mostly seeing combat with the latter in the Middle East theatre.

In Finnish hands the Bristol Bulldog shot down 6 Soviet aircraft for only 1 loss.

The Japanese made extensive use of the fast Mitsubishi F1M2 Type 0 "Pete" seaplane.

The Nakajima E8N "Dave" seaplane saw limited service during the war.

There are many more biplanes which served in the Second World War,we will try to add them all to this post when time permits.

Russia Buys Mistrals

2011-06-17T17:13:00.000-07:00

Reuters is reporting that Russia has finally placed a long talked about order for French Mistral class assault ships.

France is to build 2 of the vessels with the other 2 being built in Russia.

It is interesting that a country with one of the World's largest land borders feels the need for such amphibious ships to deploy it's troops.

The article says that 2 French made ships will cost (U.S.) $1,520 Million ((U.K.) £944 Million) or $760 Million (£474 Million) each.

It is not clear if this figure includes any licensing fee or other costs relating to the 2 ships to be built in Russia but it makes an interesting comparison with the cost of British and American amphibious vessels.

Armoured Vehicle Design : Density

2011-06-15T20:46:00.000-07:00

Density is the ratio of mass to volume or in plain language,how much stuff* there is in a particular space,the more we put in to a particular space,the greater the density.

An armoured vehicle is essentially an armoured box to which is added weapons,sensors and a drivetrain.

We are going to use this cube as a simple mathematical substitute for an armoured vehicle hull in order to explain a basic problem related to amphibious armoured vehicle design.

For the sake of simplicity we will ignore the thickness of armour and concentrate on it's weight per unit area.

If each side of this cube was 2 metres long,it would have a volume of 8 cubic metres and a surface area of 24 square metres.

If we cover that area in armour weighing 1 tonne per square metre the cube will weigh 24 tonnes and have a density of 3 tonnes per cubic metre.

If we cover that area in heavier armour weighing 2 tonnes per square metre the cube will weigh 48 tonnes and have a density of 6 tonnes per cubic metre.

The greater the weight of armour a vehicle carries,the greater it's density.

For a given weight,increasing a vehicle's internal volume or reducing it's weight of armour will reduce it's density and increase it's vulnerability.

Conversely,reducing the internal volume or increasing the weight of armour will increase the vehicle's density giving higher levels of protection.

Well protected vehicles have high densities and low density vehicles have poor protection.

This is a particular problem for amphibious vehicles.

In order to float,an amphibious vehicle must weigh less than the volume of water it displaces.

As the density of fresh water is 1 tonne per cubic metre,an amphibious armoured vehicle must have a density which is lower than this.

This is a fundamental limitation on the armour protection of an amphibious vehicle - a small amphibious vehicle can carry only very lightweight armour.

However,there is a solution to this problem.

If we were to look at a larger cube with each side being 6 metres long then each side would have an area of 36 square metres and the cube as a whole would have an area of 216 square metres and a volume of 216 cubic metres.

If we cover this larger cube in armour weighing 1 tonne per square metre it will weigh 216 tonnes and have a density of 1 tonne per cubic metre.

As this is the same as water,this armoured cube will float.

Compare this to the cube with 2 metre long sides mentioned above,even though both carry armour weighing 1 tonne per square metre,the cube with 6 metre long sides has only one third the density of the smaller cube.

This is why heavily armoured battleships are very large and also why the L.V.T 5 amphibious vehicle was so big.

The heavier the armour an amphibious vehicle carries,the larger that vehicle must be in order to float.

But very large amphibious vehicles may be too big for use on roads designed for much smaller land vehicles.

Increasing an amphibious vehicle's armour protection increases it's size and reduces it's practicality on land.

Reducing an amphibious vehicle's armour protection allows it to be smaller and more practical on land,though more vulnerable.

There is a way round this problem which entails adding additional buoyancy external to the vehicle's armour.

The most well known example of this is the collapsible floatation screen most famously used by the Duplex Drive (D.D.) tanks of the Second World War.

These screens were flexible and vulnerable to damage by both enemy fire and the action of the sea resulting in the loss of many vehicles.

Building more robust collapsible buoyancy screens would be complex,expensive and heavy.

Another alternative is to fit rigid external buoyancy boxes.

These add more dead weight and bulk than collapsible screens.

Rigid buoyancy boxes were often designed for very heavy vehicles with little inherent buoyancy and consequently were inconveniently large.

A more practical design is a composite of the three approaches mentioned above.

If a vehicle has an under armour density close to that of water,it may only require a modest amount of additional external buoyancy in order to float.

Rigid external buoyancy boxes filled with buoyant material may be added flush to the top of the vehicle as well as the sides,front and rear adding the required modest amount of additional buoyancy without being impractically large.

This composite approach allows an overall density low enough for floatation combined with an under armour density far higher than that of a vehicle with all of it's buoyancy carried under armour.

A modest amount of additional external buoyancy may be all that is needed to turn a 30 tonne medium armoured personnel carrier in to an amphibious vehicle.

*Explaining the definition of mass and weight to the lay reader is beyond the scope of this article so we will keep things simple instead,even if not technically correct.

United States' Navy Torpedoes British Windmill

2011-06-11T18:19:00.000-07:00

As a result of British defence cuts,the American submarine U.S.S. Seawolf,lead ship of her class and one of the most powerful vessels in the World,has reportedly been called in to destroy troublesome windmills in the United Kingdom.

This unusual use of a submarine brings to mind the possibility of using submarine launched Tomahawk cruise missiles to destroy windmills as far as 1,000 miles inland,eliminating the need for expensive,long range land based bombers.

Full details can be found here.

One Nation,One Air Force?

2011-04-13T17:20:00.000-07:00

This blog has never suggested abolishing the Royal Air Force*.

However,there are those who suggest that it would be cheaper to consolidate all aviation in a single organisation (usually the Royal Air Force).

This is called the "one nation,one air force" approach.

Here we shall consider if there are any savings to be had from this approach.

The cost of maintaining the means of delivering air power is defined by the following factors:

The number of sorties and/or hours on station required in theatre;

The number of aircraft required in theatre to generate that capability;

The number of aircraft required in the fleet to generate the required number of aircraft in theatre;

The cost of operating each of those aircraft;

Overhead costs.

For example,during the Falklands War in 1982,the Royal Navy required a total fleet of 31 Sea Harriers to deploy 28 aircraft in to theatre in order to generate about 30 sorties per day - 1.03 aircraft required per sortie per day.

In contrast,today the Royal Air Force requires a fleet of 136 Tornados to deploy just 20 aircraft in to theatre for operations over Afghanistan and Libya where they are probably (there are only limited figures available for Libya) generating about 10 sorties per day in total - about 13.6 aircraft required per sortie per day.

In addition,the Royal Navy's Sea Harriers cost far less than the Royal Air Force Tornados and had very little in the way of overhead costs as the Fleet Air Arm is an integral part of the Royal Navy rather than an independent air service with it's own "head office".

By factoring in costs for each aircraft type and overheads we could compare cost effectiveness.

Though it should be noted that we should be comparing aircraft which can do the same jobs,a Tornado is not much use at air defence and would be better compared to a Harrier G.R.9a.

Capability Requirement

This is the required number of daily sorties and/or hours on station,depending on the type of misson being flown.

First we must consider the number of sorties required for major war fighting operations.

Major War Fighting Operations:

The peak of British air power since the Second World War was the Suez crisis in 1956 when hundreds of combat sorties were flown each day,2 thirds of them from aircraft carriers.

Since then however,there have been significant changes in technology with the result that a modern combat aircraft can do in a single sortie what would have taken dozens of sorties by an entire wing of aircraft back in 1956.

Suez then is not a good guide for future requirements.

The next highest example of sortie generation was the liberation of Kuwait,Operation Granby,in 1990 - 1991.

British combat aircraft averaged 74** sorties per day during the 43 day air war.

Precision guided weapons were in the minority during this conflict and consequently fewer sorties would be required to perform the same tasks today.

Then there is the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

British combat aircraft averaged 50 sorties per day during the 31 day air war.

This was well within the modern era of precision guided weapons and is highly likely to be representative of future medium scale operations.

Below that is the Falklands War of 1982.

British combat aircraft averaged 33 sorties per day during the 45 day air war.

The number of sorties in the Falklands War was restricted by the limited number of available carrier capable aircraft and proved to be less than was needed.

Had larger aircraft carriers been available with more aircraft the average number of daily sorties would certainly have been far higher.

Lastly there is the Korean War of 1950 to 1953.

This was something of a mix of major war fighting operation and long term low level commitment.

British combat aircraft averaged 20 sorties a day during the 1128 day air war.

British,American and Australian aircraft carriers took turns on station off the Korean coast,consequently the average number of sorties flown during the war is far less than the average number generated in the course of a patrol.

Up to 126 sorties were flown in a day by British aircraft carriers (with air wings of similar size to the new Queen Elizabeth class) which often averaged over 80 sorties a day during their patrols.

Low Intensity Sustained Conflicts:

All other operations since 1945 averaged so few combat aircraft sorties per day (often none) that they cannot be considered major war fighting operations.

These sustained long term low level commitments often involve no more than a single squadron of combat aircraft.

Typical is the deployment of 8 Tornados to Afghanistan where they generate 5 or 6 sorties a day.

These sustained low intensity operations rarely exceed an average of 12 sorties per day.

On recent sustained operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the requirement could be expressed as 24 flying hours per day.

The Tornado fleet is probably generating a similar number of daily flying hours in operations against the Libyan government.

Conclusion:

50 sorties per day is highly likely to satisfy demand during a medium scale major war fighting operation.

This is within the capability of a single Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier.

24 hours on station a day is likely to satisfy demand during most sustained low intensity operations.

Capability Generation

This determines the number of aircraft which must be deployed to generate the required number of daily sorties/hours on station.

The greater the number of daily sorties/hours on station which each aircraft generates,the smaller the number of aircraft which must be deployed in to theatre.

The land based combat aircraft of the Royal Air Force have taken part in only 4 of the 7 major air wars the United Kingdom Has been involved in since 1945.

In every case they generated far fewer sorties per aircraft per day than carrier based naval aircraft which took part in those same conflicts.

We may consider sortie generation in terms of major war fighting operations which generally require a maximum effort and long term low intensity sustained conflicts where sortie generation is more demand based and generally lower.

Major War Fighting Operations:

Korea

No Royal Air Force combat aircraft took part in the Korean War of 1950 to 1953.

Aircraft of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm provided all British combat air power during that conflict.

The small British carriers were regularly generating over 80 sorties per day and on occasions as many as 123 sorties per day,with just 31 aircraft.

The Fleet Air Arm's air wings routinely generated more than 2 sorties per aircraft per day and occasionally as many as 4 sorties per aircraft per day.

Suez

Land based combat aircraft of the Royal Air Force operated alongside carrier based aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

During the 6 day air war,the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm generated twice as many sorties per aircraft per day as the Royal Air Force.

Falklands

During the Falklands War of 1982,Royal Navy Sea Harriers geneated 1.4 sorties per aircraft per day.

Royal Air Force Harriers based on the same ships generated just 0.9 sorties per aircraft per day.

Land based Vulcan bombers of the Royal Air Force generated just 0.03 sorties per aircraft per day - one of the worst examples of sortie generation in the history of air warfare.

Kuwait

During the liberation of Kuwait in 1990 - 1991,Aircraft flying from American aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf generated 40% more sorties per aircraft per day than land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

Kosovo

During the bombing of Kosovo in 1999,American carrier based aircraft generated more than twice as many sorties per aircraft per day as the land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

Afghanistan

During the Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,land based Tornados of the Royal Air Force flew no combat sorties at all,despite being based in the Persian Gulf near American F16s and F15s which did take part in that operation.

British aircraft carriers operated helicopters in the air assault role.

American carrier based F18s flying from ships in the Arabian Sea generated 4 times as many sorties per aircraft per day as the American land based F15s flying from bases in the Persian Gulf.

Iraq

During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 carrier based aircraft on U.S.S. Kittyhawk generated twice as many sorties per aircraft per day as land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

In major war fighting operations over the last 66 years,sortie generation by British combat aircraft has ranged from a peak of 4 sorties per aircraft in a single day by the Fleet Air Arm's carrier based aircraft in the Falklands and Korean wars and an average of 2.8 sorties per aircraft per day by carrier aircraft throughout the Suez conflict to just 0.03 sorties per aircraft per day by the Royal Air Force's Vulcan bombers during the Falklands War.

These figures can be translated into a requirement for the number of deployed aircraft required to generate a single sortie.

For example,during the Suez crisis it required just 0.36 Royal Navy carrier based aircraft to generate a sortie per day.

During the same conflict it required 0.71 Royal Air Force land based aircraft to generate a single sortie per day.

During the Falklands War it required just 0.71 Royal Navy carrier based Sea Harriers to generate a sortie per day.

During the Falklands War it required just 1.11 Royal Air Force carrier based Harriers to generate a sortie per day.

During the same conflict it would have required a massive 36 Royal Air Force land based Vulcan bombers to generate a single sortie per day.

Low Intensity Sustained Conflicts:

Sortie generation is also more demand based during these operations.

However,British and American aircraft carriers routinely sustain higher sortie rates than land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force in long term low intensity operations.

Conclusion:

In every major war fighting operation over the 66 years since 1945,carrier based aircraft have generated more sorties per day than land based combat aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

During low level,long term sustained conflicts sortie generation is of less economic importance as the number of aircraft required is only a small proportion of the fleet required to satisfy the sortie generation requirement for major war fighting operations.

The critical economic factor is the number of aircraft required to satisfy demand during major warfighting operations.

Force Generation

The percentage of the combat aircraft fleet which may be surged in to theatre for a major war fighting operation or sustained in theatre for a sustained low intensity conflict defines the size and cost of the combat aircraft fleet which the taxpayer must pay to maintain.

Major War Fighting Operations:

During the Falklands War of 1982 the Royal Navy deployed 90% of it's Sea Harrier fleet on combat operations.

This was one of the finest examples of force generation in the history of air warfare.

The Royal Air Force has never deployed more than 15% of it's combat aircraft fleet to any war in the 66 years since 1945.

Just under 15% of the 136 strong Royal Air Force Tornado fleet will be on operations (12 over Libya and 8 in Afghanistan) when 4 additional aircraft deploy to Italy.

This is despite despite the Tornados having no other commitments.

In addition 10 (originally,now 8) Typhoons were deployed to Italy which,combined with the 20 Tornados on operations in Libya and Afghanistan account for less than 15% of the 207 strong combined Tornado and Typhoon fleet.

Low Intensity Sustained Conflicts:

Harmony guidelines are the overriding factor in determining the size of force which may be sustained in theatre.

These are split into "Individual Separated Service" guidelines which cover individuals and "Unit Tour Intervals" which cover complete units (e.g. a fighter squadron):

"Army harmony guidelines are that individuals should not exceed 415 days of separated service in any period of 30 months.

At unit level,tour intervals (a tour being 6 months) should be no less than 24 months.

The decision on who should deploy is made by Joint Commitments in consultation with Headquarters Land Command,ratified by the chain of command.

Royal Navy harmony guidelines are that no individual should exceed 660 days of separated service in a three-year rolling period.

Over a similar time span, ships or other units should not be deployed for more than 60 per cent. of their time.

Harmony Guidelines for the RAF are based on formed unit tour intervals rather than individual personnel,whereby formed units,or sub-elements within them should spend four months on deployed operations followed by 16 months at base.

The RAF Individual Separated Service assumption is that an individual should spend no more than 140 days of duty detached away from home in a rolling 12-month period.

This allows for a four-month operational tour followed by three weeks of separated service due to routine tasks,unestablished commitments,unit assistance,pre-detachment training etc."

These guidelines can be summarised as follows:

Percentage of Individuals who may be away from home at any one time:

Royal Navy/Royal Marines 60%

Army 45%

Royal Air Force 38%

Percentage of units which may be deployed at any one time:

Royal Navy/Royal Marines 60%

Army 20%

Royal Air Force 20%

As these figures include time spent training away from home,in practice the proportion of each service which may be deployed on operations differs from these numbers.

The Army and Royal Air Force will conduct more of their training at home than the Royal Navy which has to go to sea for much of it's training.

The Royal Navy will routinely have 33% of it's units deployed on operations,even in "peacetime".

Rear Admiral Simon Charlier said the following in evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee on the 2nd of june 2009:

"The Navy is configured against a set of parameters that it has used for many years that usually rotate round a six-month average deployment cycle at sea.

We try to give the teams 12 months off after that.

That means that 660 days over a three-year rolling period is the maximum time we can have people away.

Those are the terms and conditions of service in which people join the Navy. They are very clear and we understand them.

In a normal cycle of deployment at sea—in surge operations we are content to go outside those parameters and give more time when they come back—that works adequately."

A real World example is the helicopter fleet in Afghanistan in 2009,according to Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt:

"Our average deployment cycle is about three months, so that gives us a 12-month gap between tours.

That is the rule of thumb we are using and it is working well in the Chinook, Puma, Merlin and Lynx communities,so I am confident that the points you make are covered in those crews."

"For the reasons I mentioned earlier,the Harmony rate for the Apache air crew, ground crew and engineers is about a rule of four,so one on three off,which is taking its toll."

"Sea King crews are worse than that; they have a rule of between three and four,so they are doing one on two and a half off."

This can be summed up as follows:

Royal Air Force Chinooks,Merlins and Pumas,20% deployed;

Army Air Corps Lynx,20% deployed;

Army Air Corps Apache 25% deployed;

Royal Navy Sea King 28% deployed.

It can be seen both from the Harmony guidelines and from actual operations in Afghanistan that the Royal Navy deploys a much larger percentage of it's units and men.

Conclusion:

The Royal Air Force requires a much larger and more expensive combat aircraft fleet than the Royal Navy to surge the required number of aircraft for major combat operations.

It also requires a larger number squadrons to sustain a squadron on long term operations.

The Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm would require 3 squadrons to keep a single squadron deployed on operations.

The Royal Air Force would require 5 squadrons to keep a single squadron deployed on operations.

If all fast jet and support helicopters were transferred to the Royal Navy it could sustain operations in theatre with a 40% fewer units.

Transferring all combat aircraft and support helicopters to the Royal Navy will result in significant cost savings.

Overheads

The Royal Navy,Royal Air Force and British Army all have their "back office" - senior officers,training facilities,headquarters and other elements which add "overhead" costs.

If all military aviation were to be transferred to the Royal Air Force,there would be no significant saving on "overheads" as the Royal Navy and British Army would still require their "back offices" to support the sea and land elements of those services.

If all military aviation were to be transferred to the Royal Navy and/or British Army there would be no need for the Royal Air Force "back office" allowing the elimination of large numbers of senior officer's posts,head quarters,training facilities and other expenses resulting in substantial cost savings.

Conclusion:

Eliminating the Royal Air Force will result in substantial reductions in overhead costs.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Secretary of State for Defence should consider creating internal competion to decide which service delivers aviation capabilities.

The division of air assets should be decided by which service can deliver capability most cost effectively and not by history or inter service politics.

Competitive tendering as part of an internal defence market may be the solution.

Rather than the usual black propaganda and backstabbing,inter-service rivalry may be channelled in to positive competition to provide combat services to the taxpayer.

Services should be asked to submit fixed price tenders for the provision of a defined capability,for example the ability to surge a number of daily sorties/hours on station for short term major warfighting operations or sustained low intensity operations.

On the metrics we have studied here,it appears that the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm has a significant competitive advantage.

Any financial shortfalls resulting from under bidding should be taken from the budget of the provider which fails to deliver the service on cost.

Alternatively,Harmony guidelines could be standardised across the armed forces as per Royal Navy practice.

This would result in significant cost savings across the armed forces.

*Because people join the army and navy to see the world,not to see Norfolk.

**Official sources give figures which range from an average of 70-74 sorties per day.